Chapter 1
Language Models: From Next-Token Prediction to Useful Systems
Chapter: Introduction, in Daniel Jurafsky and James H. Martin, Speech and Language Processing, 3rd edition draft, August 19, 2026.
Topics to learn
Page numbers refer to the linked chapter PDF.
- What makes a language model large pp. 3-5
- Parameters as weights and biases p. 5
- How model size and training tokens scale with compute p. 5
- Size, inference cost, and resource tradeoffs p. 5
- Monolingual and multilingual models p. 4
- Tokens versus words, including shorter tokens outside English p. 5
- What next-token prediction can teach pp. 6-8
- Conditional distributions and autoregressive generation p. 4
- Prompting as conditional generation p. 7
- The distributional hypothesis p. 6
- The Shannon game, information, and compression p. 8
- Neural networks, embeddings, and model access p. 9
- Weights as the learned computation p. 9
- Open-weight and closed or proprietary models p. 9
- History of the field pp. 10-11
- Statistical and neural foundations p. 10
- The symbolic turn p. 11
- The revival of empiricism p. 11
- Prompting and the current language-model period p. 11
- Language structure and interaction pp. 12-13
- Syntax, semantic roles, coreference, and discourse p. 12
- Conversational common ground and grounding p. 13
- Sycophancy and overconfidence in dialogue p. 13
- Probing a representation versus showing the model uses that structure p. 12
- Using linguistic structure in cognitive and social science p. 13
- Training pp. 13-18
- Pretraining data, including Common Crawl, curation, deduplication, and quality or toxicity filters p. 15
- Filter failures, copyright, privacy, skew, and provenance p. 15
- Instruction tuning p. 15
- Preference pairs, and PPO and DPO by name p. 17
- Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards, including formal output constraints p. 17
- Inference pp. 19-21
- System, user, and assistant roles p. 20
- Zero-shot and few-shot prompting p. 19
- What demonstrations contribute, and when more of them stop helping p. 19
- Chain-of-thought and test-time compute p. 20
- The full path from an assembled prompt to a stopped generation p. 20
- Agents p. 22
- Acting by calling programs p. 22
- The reason, act, and observe loop p. 22
- Appending observations to the context p. 22
- Evaluation pp. 23-26
- Accuracy on benchmarks such as MMLU, BIG-Bench Hard, GSM8K, and AIME24 p. 23
- Perplexity p. 25
- Human rubrics and LLM-as-a-judge, singly or pairwise p. 25
- Proxy overlap metrics such as chrF, BLEU, and ROUGE p. 26
- Goodhart's law and statistical significance p. 26
- Latency, energy, and fairness, including worst-group comparisons p. 26
- Safety, alignment, and wording pp. 27-29
- Dependence, de-skilling, and sycophancy p. 27
- Representational harm and unequal performance p. 28
- Privacy, misuse, and environmental cost p. 28
- Prompt injection and other agent risks p. 28
- Value-sensitive design, review boards, constitutional AI, and red teaming pp. 28-29
- Anthropomorphism and the intentional stance p. 29
FAQ
Does a next-token probability of 0.9 mean the statement is 90% true?
No. It is the model's probability for that continuation in that context. A familiar false claim can still get a high probability.
Do five labeled examples in a prompt fine-tune the model?
Not in an ordinary generation pass. The examples change the context. Fine-tuning is a separate procedure that updates parameters.
What scaling relation does this chapter state?
For a fixed compute budget, Hoffmann et al. found that the compute-optimal parameter count and token count both grow about as the square root of compute. Bigger is not free: inference cost and resource use rise too.
Is conversational grounding the same as retrieval grounding?
No. In this chapter, grounding is how people signal understanding or ask for clarification. Retrieval grounding, covered later, is about tying an answer to retrieved evidence.
What counts as an agent here?
An agent is a language model that can call other programs, observe the result, append that observation to its context, and loop. Mentioning a tool is not the same loop.
Why does the chapter object to saying a model understands?
Learn, think, and understand are convenient shorthand. They are not evidence that the system has human intentions. The chapter calls this habit the intentional stance.